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National Federation of the Blind v. Federal Trade
Commission: The Fourth Circuit's Uncertain Scrutiny of the
Telemarketing Sales Rule
"There are few more annoying occurrences than the disruption
of one's sleep due to a late-night or early-morning phone call by a
telephone solicitor."1  While telemarketing calls may be highly
annoying and intrusive to their unwilling recipients, for nonprofit
organizations, telemarketing serves as an invaluable tool for raising
the funds necessary to support their charitable operations.2
Furthermore, because "solicitation is characteristically intertwined
with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for
particular causes,"3 telemarketing is also a means by which charities
can advocate for their causes and spread information about their
charitable missions.4 As a result, the United States Supreme Court
has consistently held that charitable solicitation is protected speech
under the First Amendment, including even the annoying and
disruptive calls of telemarketers.5
In 2005, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") promulgated
the Telemarketing Sales Rule ("TSR"),j imposing various limitations
on professional telemarketers who solicit charitable contributions.7
1. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331, 351 (4th Cir. 2005) (Duncan, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2058 (2006); see also Kevin Pang, Consumer Reaction to
No-Call List: Deafening; On the First Day, at Least 735,000 People Put Their Phone
Numbers in an FTC Database To Block Telemarketing Calls, CHi. TRIB., June 28, 2003, at
Cl (quoting statement of President George W. Bush that "[ulnwanted telemarketing calls
are intrusive, they are annoying, and they're all too common").
2. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 355 (Duncan, J., dissenting) ("The ability
to raise funds is the lifeblood of a charity." (citing Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C.,
487 U.S. 781, 789 (1988))); see also Ellen Harris et al., Fundraising into the 1990s: State
Regulation of Charitable Solicitation After Riley, U.S.F. L. REV. 571, 572 (1990)
("Fundraising is often vital to enable charities to provide services and benefits to the
public.").
3. Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
4. Harris et al., supra note 2, at 584 ("Many charities utilize fundraising for the
purpose of advocating ideas and disseminating information, as well as for soliciting
funds.").
5. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 787-88; Sec'y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson, Inc., 467
U.S. 947, 959 (1984); Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632-33.
6. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2006).
7. Specific restrictions imposed by the TSR include: (1) a prohibition on calls
between 9:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m.; (2) a requirement that telemarketers submit their name
and telephone number to caller ID services; (3) an obligation that telemarketers refrain
from calling a person who has previously asked not to be called (the "do-not-call list"
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With respect to nonprofit organizations, the TSR regulations apply
only to calls made by professional telemarketers soliciting donations
on behalf of nonprofit organizations.8 The regulations do not apply to
a nonprofit organization's volunteer or "in-house" callers.9  In
National Federation of the Blind v. FTC, 0 two nonprofit organizations
that rely on professional telemarketers to solicit donations challenged
the TSR on the grounds that it violated the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution." The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit rejected this challenge, holding that the TSR
regulations are consistent with the First Amendment12 and that the
application of those regulations solely to professional telemarketers
does not render the TSR unconstitutionally underinclusive. 3
This Recent Development will attack the Fourth Circuit's First
Amendment analysis on two distinct grounds. First, this Recent
Development will argue that the court erred by not initially
determining the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to the
TSR, thus resulting in a fundamentally flawed analysis of the
regulations. The court's failure to make the crucial determination
whether to apply strict or intermediate scrutiny not only resulted in
an uncertain analysis of the TSR, but also set an erroneous precedent
for the Fourth Circuit. Second, this Recent Development will argue
that the court misconstrued the "neutral justification" requirement
when evaluating whether the regulations were unconstitutionally
underinclusive by failing to determine how limiting the application of
the TSR solely to professional telemarketers furthered the
government's purported interests. As a result, the court erroneously
upheld the TSR when it should have instead struck down the
regulations as unconstitutionally underinclusive.
This Recent Development will first discuss the statutory and
rulemaking history of the TSR. Then this Recent Development will
examine the level of scrutiny the First Amendment requires for
charitable solicitation regulations, ultimately concluding that the
provision); (4) a requirement that callers promptly disclose the name of the organization
for which they are seeking donations; and (5) a prohibition on "abandoned calls." See id.
§ 310.4(a)-(e). An "abandoned call" occurs when the person receiving the call is not
connected with a telemarketer within two seconds of answering. Id. § 310.4(b)(1)(iv).
8. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. FI7C, 420 F.3d 331, 334 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 2058 (2006); infra note 30 and accompanying text.
9. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 334; infra note 30.
10. 420 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2058 (2006).
11. Id. at 336.
12. Id. at 351.
13. See id. at 345-49.
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Fourth Circuit erred by failing to consider whether strict or
intermediate scrutiny should have applied to the TSR. Finally, this
Recent Development will address the court's erroneous holding that
the TSR is not unconstitutionally underinclusive, therefore
concluding that the limited application of the TSR to professional
telemarketers was not adequately supported by a "neutral
justification.' 14
The FTC's decision to limit the TSR regulations to professional
telemarketers was a result of several pieces of legislation defining the
FTC's jurisdiction and regulatory authority.15 In 1994, Congress
passed the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse
Prevention Act ("Telemarketing Act"), 6 which granted the FTC
authority to prohibit deceptive and abusive telemarketing practices.17
Under the Telemarketing Act, "telemarketing" was narrowly defined
to include only calls related to the sale and purchase of goods.18 Thus,
telephone calls soliciting charitable contributions were beyond the
scope of the FTC's control. 9 Furthermore, the Telemarketing Act
restricted the FTC to regulating within its prescribed jurisdictional
limits by referencing the FTC's organic statute, the Federal Trade
Commission Act ("FTC Act")." Under the FTC Act, the FTC has
the authority to exercise jurisdiction over "persons, partnerships, or
corporations,"'" with "corporation" defined as a company or
association "organized to carry on business for its own profit or that
of its members."22  Nonprofit organizations do not fall within this
definition of "corporation" and are thus not within the FTC's
14. In addition to the First Amendment challenge to the TSR, the Fourth Circuit
addressed and ultimately rejected arguments that the TSR exceeded the scope of the
FTC's statutory authority, see id. at 336-38, and that the TSR violated the Equal
Protection Clause, see id. at 350 n.8. A complete analysis of these issues is beyond the
scope of this Recent Development, which focuses on the Fourth Circuit's First
Amendment analysis.
15. See id. at 334-36.
16. Pub. L. No. 103-297, 108 Stat. 1545 (1994) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6101-08 (2000 & Supp. II 2002)).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 6102(a)(1) (2000).
18. Id. § 6106(4) ("The term 'telemarketing' means a plan, program, or campaign
which is conducted to induce purchases of goods or services by use of one or more
telephones and which involves more than one interstate telephone call.").
19. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 334.
20. See Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act, Pub. L. No.
103-297, § 6(a), 108 Stat 1545, 1549 (1994) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6105(a)
(2000)) ("[N]o activity which is outside the jurisdiction of [the FTC Act] shall be affected
by this Act.").
21. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2).
22. Id. § 44.
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jurisdiction. 23  The Telemarketing Act clearly left this jurisdictional
limitation unchanged, and the FTC therefore had no authority to
regulate directly the telemarketing practices of nonprofit
organizations.24
In 2001, Congress altered the scope of the FTC's telemarketing
authority by passing the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act ("PATRIOT Act").' Section 1011 of the PATRIOT
Act, titled "Crimes Against Charitable Americans," amended the
1994 Telemarketing Act by broadening the definition of
"telemarketing" to include calls made to induce charitable
contributions and donations.26  Although the definition of
telemarketing was expanded, the PATRIOT Act did not expand the
FTC's jurisdiction to include nonprofit entities.27 As a result, the FTC
had the authority to regulate telemarketing aimed at soliciting
charitable contributions, but did not have the power to directly
regulate nonprofit organizations.28 Pursuant to its authority under the
newly amended Telemarketing Act, the FTC promulgated the TSR in
2005.29 In an effort to reconcile the new definition of telemarketing
23. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 334.
24. Id.
25. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
26. Id. § 1011(b)(3), 115 Stat. at 396 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 6106(4)
(Supp. II 2002)). The newly amended Telemarketing Act defines "telemarketing" as "a
plan, program, or campaign which is conducted to induce purchases of goods or services,
or a charitable contribution, donation, or gift of money or any other thing of value, by use
of one or more telephones and which involves more than one interstate telephone call."
15 U.S.C. § 6106(4) (Supp. II 2002) (emphasis added). This particular provision was
included in the PATRIOT Act as a result of Congress's concern that fraudulent
organizations would take advantage of charitable donors in the aftermath of the
September 11 terrorist attacks. See August Meacham, Comment, To Call or Not To Call?
An Analysis of Current Charitable Telemarketing Regulations, 12 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 61, 66 (2004); see also JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN SCHWARZ,
NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 317 (3d ed. 2006) ("Congress
expected the enormous charitable response in the aftermath of 9/11 to be accompanied by
a corresponding increase in fraudulent fundraising.").
27. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 335; see also Telemarketing Sales Rule, 67
Fed. Reg. 4492, 4496 (proposed Jan. 30, 2002) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310)
("[N]either the text of section 1011 nor its legislative history suggest that it amends Section
6105(a) of the Telemarketing Act-the provision which incorporates the jurisdictional
limitations of the FTC Act into the Telemarketing Act ... ").
28. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 335. The Fourth Circuit quite succinctly
summarized the effect of the PATRIOT Act: "The PATRIOT Act ... expanded what
'acts and practices' could be regulated by the FTC under the Telemarketing Act, but it did
not change what type of entity was subject to the FTC's control." Id.
29. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310 (2005).
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supplied by the PATRIOT Act with its jurisdictional limitations, the
FTC concluded that the TSR regulations would only apply to
professional telemarketers calling on behalf of nonprofit
organizations; volunteer or "in-house" callers acting on behalf of a
charity were not subject to the TSR.3°
In National Federation of the Blind, the Fourth Circuit
confronted a challenge to the FTC's interpretation of the TSR. The
court applied a two-part test that was set forth in Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,31 where the United
States Supreme Court held that charitable solicitation should be
treated as fully protected speech under the First Amendment. 2 The
Schaumburg Court reasoned that "solicitation is characteristically
intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking
support for particular causes or for particular views on economic,
political, or social issues, and ... without solicitation the flow of such
information and advocacy would likely cease."33 Holding, however,
that charitable solicitation may be subject to "reasonable
regulation,"34 the Court used two factors to judge the constitutionality
of a charitable solicitation regulation: first, whether the regulation
"serves a sufficiently strong, subordinating interest that the
[government] is entitled to protect,"3 and second, whether the
regulation is "narrowly drawn ... to serve those interests without
unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms. '3 6
Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit began its analysis of the
regulations in National Federation of the Blind by stating, "It is
unclear whether this standard amounts to 'strict scrutiny' (as the
30. Telemarketing Sales Rule, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4585 (Jan. 29, 2003) (to be codified
at 16 C.F.R. pt. 310) ("Reading the amendments to the Telemarketing Act effectuated by
§ 1011 of the USA PATRIOT Act together with the unchanged sections of the
Telemarketing Act compels the conclusion that for-profit entities that solicit charitable
donations now must comply with the TSR, although the Rule's applicability to charitable
organizations themselves is unaffected.").
31. 444 U.S. 620 (1980); Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 335-36.
32. See Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632. In Schaumburg, a nonprofit environmental
protection organization challenged a local ordinance which prohibited door-to-door
solicitation by charitable organizations unless the organization could prove that at least
seventy-five percent of the proceeds were used for charitable purposes. Id. at 624-25.
33. Id. at 632. The Court based its decision on a long line of precedent, see id. at 628-
32, and held that these "prior authorities ... clearly establish that charitable appeals for
funds, on the street or door to door, involve a variety of speech interests-communication
of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of
causes-that are within the protection of the First Amendment," id. at 632.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 636.
36. Id. at 637.
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charities allege) or to the less stringent 'intermediate scrutiny' (as the
FTC urges).... Regardless of the label, the substance of the test is
clear."37  This statement is erroneous because by choosing not to
address whether the Schaumburg test requires strict or intermediate
scrutiny at the outset of its analysis, the court failed to define how
stringently the test should be applied. Furthermore, the statement
reflects the court's failure to recognize the critical distinction between
content-based and content-neutral speech regulations and the
differing standards of review applied to each. Some of the TSR
regulations were content-based and others were content-neutral, each
category requiring the use of a different level of scrutiny. As such, by
failing to establish the correct standard of review, the court conducted
a flawed analysis of the regulations.
The Fourth Circuit erred by failing to analyze each of the
individual TSR requirements to determine whether they were
content-neutral or content-based, a distinction that has been
described "as a crucial one in First Amendment law."38 In general,
the Supreme Court has held that content-based speech regulations
are subject to strict scrutiny review, and in order for such regulations
to be upheld, the government must show that the "regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end."39 Alternatively, a content-neutral law
regulating the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be
"narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication."'
Therefore, for content-neutral speech regulations, a form of
intermediate scrutiny is applied.41
37. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331, 338 n.2 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 2058 (2006).
38. See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW
193 (1999); see also DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 21 (1998) ("The
content distinction is the modern Supreme Court's closest approach to articulating a
unified First Amendment doctrine.").
39. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
40. Id.
41. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994) ("[R]egulations that
are unrelated to the content of speech are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny ......
(citing Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984))). Professor
Erwin Chemerinsky summarized the content distinction by citing Turner and stating that
"the general rule is that content-based restrictions on speech must meet strict scrutiny,
while content-neutral regulation only need meet intermediate scrutiny." ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2002). Professor Chemerinsky described
the Court's approach as a "two-tier system of review." Id. at 903.
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In approaching these alternative standards, there are two factors
that differentiate strict and intermediate scrutiny. The first factor is
the importance of the government's interest in regulating the specific
conduct. Under strict scrutiny, the government's interest must be
considered "compelling," whereas intermediate scrutiny only requires
that the government's interest be "significant. '42 The other critical
distinction between strict and intermediate scrutiny is the degree to
which the government's regulation must be tailored to its purported
interest. Under strict scrutiny review of content-based speech
regulations, the "narrowly drawn" element requires that the
government choose the "least restrictive means" necessary to
accomplish its purported interest.43  On the other hand, when
applying intermediate scrutiny, "the requirement of narrow tailoring
is satisfied 'so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial
government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the
regulation.' "' In other words, under intermediate scrutiny, the
"narrowly tailored" element does not require the government to
choose the least restrictive means to accomplish its interests.45
Therefore, it is apparent that the classification of a speech regulation
as content-based or content-neutral will affect the severity of the
court's review.46 As a result, before subjecting a speech regulation to
First Amendment analysis, a court must first decide whether the
regulation is content-neutral or content-based, which will then
determine whether strict or intermediate scrutiny should be applied.47
42. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note
41, at 519-20 (summarizing distinctions between strict and intermediate scrutiny).
43. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988) (holding that content-based speech
regulations "must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny"). The Court held that the
regulation in question was not narrowly tailored because "a less restrictive alternative
[was] readily available." Id. at 329.
44. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (quoting United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
45. Id. at 798 ("Lest any confusion on the point remain, we reaffirm today that a
regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to
serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least
restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so." (emphasis added)); see also Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726 (2000) ("[W]hen a content-neutral regulation does not
entirely foreclose any means of communication, it may satisfy the tailoring requirement
even though it is not the least restrictive or least intrusive means of serving the statutory
goal.").
46. See FARBER, supra note 38, at 21 ("Government regulations linked to the content
of speech receive severe judicial scrutiny. In contrast, when government is regulating
speech, but the regulation is unrelated to content, the level of scrutiny is lower.").
47. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) ("[T]he appropriate level of
scrutiny is initially tied to whether the statute distinguishes between prohibited and
permitted speech on the basis of content."); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 41, at 901
2007] 1247
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In the context of charitable solicitation regulations, the
Schaumburg Court did not explicitly state whether the applicable
standard of review was strict or intermediate scrutiny. 4 Although
some commentators have suggested that the Court applied strict
scrutiny,49 a review of cases implementing the Schaumburg test
suggests that, like other forms of protected speech, the level of
scrutiny will vary depending on whether the charitable solicitation
regulation is content-based or content-neutral. For example, in
American Target Advertising, Inc. v. Giani,° the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed a provision of the Utah
Charitable Solicitations Act, which required "all professional
fundraising consultants to register with the state and obtain a
permit."'" In its analysis, the court first reviewed the regulation to
determine that it was content-neutral52 and then proceeded to apply
the two-part Schaumburg test using an intermediate scrutiny
standard.53 The United States Supreme Court took a similar
approach in Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North
Carolina.54  Riley involved a challenge to the North Carolina
Charitable Solicitations Act.5 After first deciding that a particular
("[A]ny law can be reviewed to determine whether it is content-based or content-neutral,
a distinction that the Court has said is crucial in determining whether strict scrutiny or
intermediate scrutiny should be used." (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622 (1994))).
48. See Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 622 (1980).
The terms "strict scrutiny" and "intermediate scrutiny" are nowhere to be found in the
Court's opinion.
49. See, e.g., John T. Haggery, Note, Begging and the Public Forum Doctrine in the
First Amendment, 34 B.C. L. REV. 1121, 1132-33 (1993) ("[Ujnder strict scrutiny, the
Court determined that the regulation did not sufficiently further the Village's asserted
interests . ); Steven R. Probst, Note, Telemarketing, Commercial Speech, and Central
Hudson: Potential First Amendment Problems for Indiana Code Section 24-4.7 and Other
"Do-Not-Call"Legislation, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 347, 395 n.280 (2003) ("The Court ...
applying strict scrutiny, invalidated the ordinance as not sufficiently narrowly tailored.").
50. 199 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2000).
51. See id. at 1246. In order to obtain a permit, professional fundraisers were required
to: (1) submit a written application, (2) pay a $250 annual fee, and (3) post a $25,000 bond
or letter of credit. Id.
52. Id. at 1247.
53. See id. ("The Act does not authorize a content-based review of the charitable
mailings .... Therefore, the Act is content neutral, and we accordingly subject it to
intermediate scrutiny.").
54. 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
55. Id. at 784. Specifically, the challenged provisions of the Act (1) defined the
reasonable fee a fundraiser was able to charge, (2) required fundraisers to disclose to
donors the percentage of revenues retained by the fundraiser in previous solicitations, and
(3) required fundraisers to obtain a license. Id.
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provision of the Act was content-based,56 the Court then applied
"exacting First Amendment scrutiny. '5 7 The Court also engaged in a
"least restrictive means" analysis, finding that "more benign and
narrowly tailored options" were available, 8 therefore holding the law
unconstitutional. 59
As American Target and Riley suggest, the Schaumburg test for
analyzing First Amendment challenges to charitable solicitation
regulations will differ depending on whether the regulation is
content-based or content-neutral, thus changing the "substance" of
the test being applied.6" The Fourth Circuit, therefore, erroneously
stated in National Federation of the Blind that "[r]egardless of the
label, the substance of the test is clear."61 Not only is the statement
clearly wrong, the court's failure to determine the correct level of
scrutiny renders its analysis fundamentally flawed, even if it happened
to reach the correct result. Instead, the court should have first
determined whether each of the TSR regulations was content-based
or content-neutral so that it could then decide whether to apply strict
or intermediate scrutiny.62
Without first drawing the content-based/content-neutral
distinction, the Fourth Circuit proceeded to address five specific TSR
regulations.63  Applying the Schaumburg test, the court first
determined that the TSR was designed to prevent fraud and protect
consumer privacy, and that both were sufficiently strong interests that
the government is entitled to protect.' The court then found that
each of the regulations imposed by the TSR was narrowly tailored to
56. Id. at 795 ("Mandating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make
necessarily alters the content of the speech. We therefore consider the Act as a content-
based regulation of speech." (citing Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256
(1974))).
57. Id. at 798.
58. Id. at 800.
59. Id. at 803.
60. See supra notes 48-59 and accompanying text.
61. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331, 338 n.2 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 2058 (2006).
62. See Brief for Veterans First in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari by
National Federation of the Blind as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4, Nat'l Fed'n
of the Blind v. FTC, 126 S. Ct. 2058 (2006) (No. 05-927) ("The Fourth Circuit's majority
dismissively cast aside both the importance and the substance of the strict scrutiny
standard of review. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit cavalierly shirked its responsibility to
define the standard it was applying ... ").
63. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 341-43; see also supra note 7 (describing
specific requirements imposed by the TSR).
64. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 339-40.
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serve the government's interests.65 Although the court did not
expressly articulate the standard of review, it appears that the court
applied the less stringent intermediate scrutiny analysis. This
conclusion is based on the fact that the court did not engage in a
"least restrictive means" analysis, which would have been necessary if
strict scrutiny were applied.66
If the Fourth Circuit had conducted a proper analysis, the first
step would have been to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny
for each of the five regulations it examined. Under this analysis, the
court would have found that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate
with respect to four of the TSR regulations. The abandoned call
prohibition, Caller ID requirement, and time-of-day restriction are
content-neutral regulations that merely affect the time or manner of
speech.67 Additionally, intermediate scrutiny was appropriate with
respect to the TSR's "do-not-call list" provision. Although the "do-
not-call list" requirement arguably regulates more than just the time,
place, or manner of the speech, it may still be considered a content-
neutral regulation because it is unrelated to the content of the
speech.6 As noted by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, "there is no meaningful distinction between evaluation
of a content neutral regulation of expressive conduct and a content
neutral time, place, or manner restriction."'69 Therefore, intermediate
scrutiny was appropriate for this restriction as well.
Unlike the above provisions, intermediate scrutiny was not
appropriate for analyzing the TSR disclosure requirement; instead,
strict scrutiny should have been applied because the fact that the
regulation compels speech renders the regulation content-based. The
TSR requires that a telemarketer making an outbound telephone call
to induce a charitable donation "truthfully, promptly, and in a clear
and conspicuous manner" identify both "[t]he identity of the
65. See id. at 341-43.
66. See id. at 339-45; see also supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (describing
application of the "least restrictive means" analysis under strict scrutiny review).
67. See Rita Marie Cain, Nonprofit Solicitation Under the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 57
FED. COMM. L.J. 81, 97 (2004) (suggesting that the time of day limitations and abandoned
call requirements can be characterized as time, place, and manner restrictions); see also id.
at 102 (arguing that the caller ID requirement may be considered narrowly tailored to the
government's interest in protecting privacy).
68. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("A regulation that
serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral .... ").
69. Am. Target Adver., Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1247 n.1 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing
Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984)). In other words, as




charitable organization on behalf of which the request is being made"
and "[t]hat the purpose of the call is to solicit a charitable
contribution. 7 °  Dealing with a similar requirement in Riley, the
Supreme Court invalidated a provision of the North Carolina
Charitable Solicitations Act, which provided,
[d]uring any solicitation and before requesting or appealing
either directly or indirectly for any charitable contribution a
professional solicitor shall disclose to the person solicited ...
[t]he average of the percentage of gross receipts actually paid to
the persons established for a charitable purpose by the
professional fund-raising counsel or professional solicitor
conducting the solicitation for all charitable sales promotions
conducted in this State by that professional fund-raising counsel
or professional solicitor for the past 12 months, or for all
completed charitable sales promotions where the professional
fund-raising counsel or professional solicitor has been soliciting
funds for less than 12 months.7'
The Court held that this was a content-based regulation because
"[m]andating speech that a speaker would not otherwise make
necessarily alters the content of the speech '72 and, as such, strict
scrutiny should apply.73 Based on the Court's reasoning in Riley, the
TSR disclosure requirement should also be considered a content-
based regulation because it, too, would alter the content of the
telemarketer's speech. If simply mandating speech that would not
otherwise be made is sufficient to establish a content-based
regulation, it follows that even a regulation as seemingly modest as
the TSR disclosure requirement should be subject to strict scrutiny.
The Fourth Circuit, however, did not apply strict scrutiny to
analyze the TSR disclosure requirement. Instead, the court relied on
language contained within a footnote in the Riley decision, which
stated that " 'nothing in this opinion should be taken to suggest that
the State may not require a fundraiser to disclose unambiguously his
or her professional status. On the contrary, such a narrowly tailored
70. FTC Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(e) (2006).
71. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781, 786 n.3 (1988) (quoting
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131C-16.1 (1986)). The North Carolina law also required the
professional fundraiser to disclose his name, as well as the name and address of the
professional fundraising counsel. Id. These provisions were not challenged in Riley. See
id. at 786.
72. Id. at 795.
73. See id. at 798 ("North Carolina's content-based regulation is subject to exacting
First Amendment scrutiny.").
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requirement would withstand First Amendment scrutiny.' "" The
Fourth Circuit went on to state that "[i]f the First Amendment
permits an obligation for a telefunder to disclose his professional
status, then surely it also permits the present modest disclosure
requirement."75 The problem with this reasoning, however, is that the
Supreme Court's statement in Riley was merely dicta because it
addressed a situation not before the Court.76 Furthermore, the
requirement that a telemarketer disclose his or her professional
status, which was approved in the Riley dicta, can be distinguished
from the TSR requirement that a telemarketer disclose the name of
his charity and the purpose of the call. Requiring a telemarketer to
expose his professional status is arguably less intrusive than the TSR
disclosure requirement.
Mandating a telemarketer to disclose promptly the name of his
charity and the purpose of the call may interfere with the
organization's ability to craft a strategy to best advocate for
donations. For example, suppose a nonprofit organization hires
professional telemarketers for a solicitation campaign, but instructs
the telemarketers to first describe the organization's mission or cause
in an effort to "feel out" the prospective donor before asking for
contributions. The charity may determine that such a nonaggressive
approach will be better suited to its mission and more likely to result
in charitable donations. However, the TSR disclosure requirement
precludes the organization from taking such an approach because the
telemarketer is required to disclose the purpose of the call at the
outset of the conversation, a requirement which could easily result in
many listeners hanging up immediately. The TSR disclosure
requirement thus acts as a fairly substantial intrusion by the
government on the right of a charity to conduct its solicitations the
best way it deems fit.
Nevertheless, by relying on the Riley dicta, the Fourth Circuit
assumed, without thorough examination, that requiring a
telemarketer to state the name of the charity and purpose of the call
74. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331, 343 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Riley,
487 U.S. at 799 n.11), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2058 (2006).
75. Id.
76. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 803 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the majority
"depart[ed] from the case at hand to make a pronouncement upon a situation not before
[the Court]"). In Riley, Justice Scalia objected to the majority's statement in footnote 11,
which referred to an unchallenged provision of the North Carolina Charitable Solicitations
Act, which required "professional fundraisers to disclose their professional status to
potential donors." Id. at 799 (majority opinion).
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would be constitutionally permissible." Although one could argue
that it is a practical necessity for telemarketers eventually to make
such disclosures if they wish to generate any money,78 that fact does
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the TSR disclosure
requirement is narrowly tailored. Rather, in order for the regulation
to be narrowly tailored in this context, it must be the least restrictive
means available to further the government's interest in preventing
fraud and protecting consumer privacy.79 Unfortunately, and much to
the detriment of nonprofit organizations that rely on professional
telemarketers, the Fourth Circuit failed to engage in such analysis.
The Fourth Circuit's conclusory assumption that the TSR disclosure
requirement passed constitutional muster was not an adequate
substitute for actual strict scrutiny review, and, as a result, the
constitutionality of the regulation remains uncertain. Therefore, in
the future, the Fourth Circuit should be more precise in its analysis
and, when strict scrutiny review is required, should engage in a
thorough review of the government's alternative channels of
regulation to determine whether the regulation in question is
narrowly tailored and the least restrictive means available to carry out
the government's interests.
In addition to upholding each of the TSR regulations under the
two-part Schaumburg test, the Fourth Circuit also addressed the issue
of whether the regulations were impermissibly underinclusive.80 A
speech regulation is considered underinclusive "when it discriminates
against some speakers but not others without a legitimate 'neutral
justification' for doing so."81 In this case, the challenged TSR
requirements apply only to professional telemarketers but not to
volunteers calling on behalf of nonprofit organizations. The result is
an underinclusive regulation that "adversely affect[s] those charities
that choose to out-source their fundraising work."' However, simply
because a regulation is underinclusive does not necessarily render it
unconstitutional.83 Rather, the underinclusiveness of a regulation
77. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 343.
78. See Cain, supra note 67, at 93 (arguing that the TSR disclosure requirement is a
"basic necessity in legitimate nonprofit solicitation" and should be constitutionally
permissible).
79. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
80. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 345-49.
81. Id. at 345 (citing City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429-
30 (1993)).
82. Id.
83. See id. ("[A] speech restriction with a limited reach is not doomed to fail First
Amendment scrutiny.").
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may have the effect of diminishing the credibility of the government's
justification for regulating," thus weakening the government's
argument that the regulation is "narrowly tailored."85 The United
States Supreme Court addressed the underinclusiveness concept in
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,86 holding that an
underinclusive speech regulation will be upheld only if supported by a
"neutral justification. '87  Furthermore, the government has the
burden to establish a "reasonable fit" between its legitimate interests
and the selective means chosen to further those interests."
In analyzing whether the TSR regulations were
unconstitutionally underinclusive, the Fourth Circuit held that the
FTC's jurisdictional boundary, which prevented it from directly
regulating nonprofit organizations, was a sufficient "neutral
justification" for the TSR's discriminatory classification.89 The court
reasoned that the distinction between professional and volunteer
telemarketers was one that the FTC was "bound to make by simple
application of its jurisdictional limitations"' because it was "the only
way to reconcile the new instructions from Congress set forth in the
PATRIOT Act with the old, unchanged instructions from Congress
set forth in the Telemarketing Act."91  Judge Allyson Duncan
dissented from the court's opinion by arguing that the FTC's
jurisdictional limitation could not serve as a sufficient neutral
justification for the TSR's discriminatory treatment of similarly
situated actors. 9 Judge Duncan emphasized the fact that the FTC
presented no evidence to suggest that professional telemarketers
84. City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 52 (1994) ("Exemptions from an otherwise
legitimate regulation of a medium of speech may be noteworthy for a reason quite apart
from the risks of viewpoint and content discrimination: They may diminish the credibility
of the government's rationale for restricting speech in the first place.").
85. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 345 ("A law is underinclusive in this sense,
and thus not narrowly tailored, when it discriminates against some speakers but not others
without a legitimate 'neutral justification' for doing so.").
86. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
87. See id. at 429-30.
88. Id. at 416.
89. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 348 ("[S]uch underinclusiveness results
from the simple fact that the PATRIOT Act designated 'charitable solicitations' as being
within the type of behavior the FTC could regulate, but it left speech by charities outside
the agency's jurisdiction. The agency's jurisdictional boundary, therefore, serves as the
'neutral justification'.....
90. Id. at 347.
91. Id.; see also supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text (discussing the FrC's
decision to limit TSR regulations solely to professional telemarketers based on a
jurisdictional limitation).
92. See Natl Fed'n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 354-55 (Duncan, J., dissenting).
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would be more likely to engage in fraudulent behavior than a
volunteer solicitor.93 Additionally, Judge Duncan pointed out that
there was no evidence to show that professional telemarketers would
be more likely to violate consumer privacy or engage in abusive
telemarketing practices than nonprofessional solicitors.94 As such, the
dissent concluded that the classification created by the TSR failed to
further the government's interests in preventing fraud and protecting
consumer privacy, and was therefore unconstitutionally
underinclusive. 5
Although the FTC's jurisdictional limitation may be considered
neutral because it is unrelated to the content of the speech,96 the
critical flaw in the court's reasoning is that this "neutral justification"
is in no way related to the government's legitimate interests in
regulating. In other words, as Judge Duncan correctly noted, the
government failed to show a "reasonable fit" between its legitimate
interests and the discriminatory means chosen to further those
interests, a showing which is required by Discovery Network.9 7 As a
result, the court should have held that the TSR's limited application
was impermissibly underinclusive and therefore unconstitutional; a
proper application of Discovery Network would warrant such a result.
To illustrate, in Discovery Network, the city of Cincinnati enforced an
ordinance that prohibited the distribution of commercial handbills on
public news racks, while exempting general newspapers from the
restriction.98 The law was challenged by Discovery Network, Inc. and
Harmon Publishing Co., two parties that distributed commercial
handbills on public news racks. 99 The Supreme Court, in striking
down the ordinance, held that the distinction between commercial
handbills and newspapers "bears no relationship whatsoever to the
particular interests that the city has asserted. It is, therefore, an
impermissible means of responding to the city's admittedly legitimate
93. Id. at 352.
94. Id. at 353.
95. See id. ("The FrC has made no showing that the professional/non-professional
distinction it employs in the TSR furthers the goals of fraud prevention and consumer
privacy. It is this showing that Discovery Network's 'neutral justification' and 'reasonable
fit' requirements compel. Because these requirements are not satisfied, the TSR cannot
survive."(citations omitted)).
96. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("A regulation that
serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral ... .
97. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 353 (Duncan, J., dissenting).
98. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 413 n.3 (1993).
99. Id. at 412-14.
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interests."'" Similarly, in National Federation of the Blind, there was
no evidence showing that the distinction between nonprofit
organizations that rely on professional telemarketers and those that
rely on volunteers was in any way related to the government's
asserted interests in preventing fraud and protecting consumer
privacy. 1°1 As a result, the Fourth Circuit should have struck down
the TSR as unconstitutionally underinclusive.
The troubling result of the Fourth Circuit's decision is that it
allows the FTC to discriminate against nonprofit organizations that
rely on professional telemarketers based simply on the FTC's
arbitrary jurisdictional boundary. Essentially, the FTC was able to
circumvent Discovery Network's "neutral justification" and
"reasonable fit" requirements by relying on its jurisdictional
limitation. °2 The Fourth Circuit should have instead required the
FTC to prove that the limited application of the TSR furthers the
government's interests. In contrast to the Fourth Circuit's erroneous
analysis, a recent case decided by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit illustrates a more appropriate approach. In
Fraternal Order of Police v. Stenehjem, °3 the Eighth Circuit upheld a
North Dakota law that prohibited telemarketers from soliciting
residents who had registered with the state's do-not-call list." The
law exempts nonprofit organizations from the prohibition, but only if
the organization uses volunteer or in-house callers. 5 Thus, the North
Dakota law creates a distinction between nonprofit organizations that
use professional telemarketers and those that rely on volunteer
callers,"° similar to the distinction created by the TSR. The Eighth
Circuit upheld the law based on a finding by the North Dakota
legislature that "professional charitable solicitors intrude more
100. Id. at 424. The interests purportedly served by enforcement of the ordinance were
the city's safety and aesthetics. Id. at 418. The Court noted that the ordinance would only
eliminate sixty-two news racks, with 1500 to 2000 news racks remaining in place. Id. at
417-18.
101. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
102. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 420 F.3d at 355-56 (Duncan, J., dissenting) ("The
majority holds ... that Congress can justify unconstitutional restrictions on speech based
upon the identity of the speaker simply by delineating jurisdiction over those speakers
between various executive agencies. This argument is untenable. It provides ajurisdictional loophole through which government can achieve indirectly that which it
cannot do directly.").
103. 431 F.3d 591 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2058 (2006).





regularly on residents' privacy than volunteers or employees.""1 7 In
other words, the distinction furthered the government's legitimate
interest in protecting consumer privacy. Unlike the Eighth Circuit,
however, the majority in National Federation of the Blind did not find
any evidence that the limited application of the TSR furthered the
government's interests, but instead erroneously relied on an arbitrary
jurisdictional boundary to serve as a neutral justification." 8 The
court's reliance on the FTC's jurisdictional limitation was
inappropriate, resulting in an erroneous holding that the TSR was not
impermissibly underinclusive.
While the Fourth Circuit held that the regulations imposed by
the Telemarketing Sales Rule were constitutionally permissible,
several errors in the court's analysis lead to the conclusion that the
Fourth Circuit reached an erroneous decision. Specifically, the court
failed to determine whether it was applying strict or intermediate
scrutiny, which resulted in a flawed and uncertain analysis of the
regulations, particularly with respect to the TSR disclosure
requirement. Because the disclosure requirement is a content-based
speech regulation, the court should have applied strict scrutiny; by
choosing not to do so, the court failed to subject the regulation to a
sufficient analysis as required by the First Amendment. Whether the
regulation could have survived strict scrutiny is unclear, and as a
result the constitutionality of the disclosure requirement remains
uncertain. Furthermore, this error begs the question as to whether
the Fourth Circuit would engage in a sufficient strict scrutiny review if
such an analysis were required in future charitable solicitation cases.
Additionally, the court did not consider how a limited application of
the TSR solely to professional telemarketers could further the
government's interests in protecting consumer privacy and preventing
fraud, and therefore erroneously held that the TSR was not
unconstitutionally underinclusive.
The unfortunate result of the Fourth Circuit's decision is that
those nonprofit organizations that rely on professional telemarketers
will be disadvantaged by the TSR regulations, limiting the ability of
such organizations to advocate for their cause and support their
operations.' 9 Because charitable donations are central to the vitality
107. Id. at 598.
108. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
109. See Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind v. FTC, 420 F.3d 331, 355 (4th Cir. 2005) (Duncan, J.,
dissenting) ("As charities compete for the finite charitable donation dollar, those charities
that either choose to or are forced to use telefunders are placed at a competitive
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of many nonprofits, the limited application of the TSR may result in
the demise of small or less popular charities that do not have the
resources to engage volunteer or in-house callers. 110  Without
recognizing the substantial limitations imposed by the TSR, the
Fourth Circuit's cursory review of the regulations denied these
organizations the full effect of their constitutional rights.
FREDERICK R. ZUFELT
disadvantage by the regulations that affect them and not their charitable counterparts."),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2058 (2006).
110. See id. ("[Flor small or unpopular charities, the ability to engage in mass volunteer
fundraising may be impossible, and thus the use of professional fundraisers may hold the
key to the entity's existence.").
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